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NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-
ORCON

Africa Review

19 January 1979

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247

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AFRICA REVIEW (U)

19 January 1979

CONTENTS

Rhodesia: The Emergence of Private Armies (U) . . . 1

Former guerrillas, who have been used to encourage other guerrillas to defect, are in practice being organized into private armies loyal to Bishop Muzorewa or to Ndabaningi Sithole. (C)

Rhodesia: Dim Economic Outlook (U) 4

The decline of the Rhodesian economy will speed up in 1979 if white emigration and guerrilla activity continue to increase. (C)

Nigeria: Election Scheduling Dilemma (U) 10

Nigeria's military rulers face some agonizing and potentially controversial decisions in scheduling elections as the country enters the most difficult phase of its planned transition to civilian rule in October. (C)

Ivory Coast: Irreparable Split Between Houphouet-Boigny and Yace (S) 13

A widening rift between Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny and his constitutional successor, Philip Yace, will probably prompt Houphouet to remove Yace from the line of succession sometime soon, [REDACTED] (S NF NC) 25X1C

25X1C

Madagascar: Ratsiraka's New Year's Speech (U) . . 17

President Ratsiraka strongly criticized the West in his New Year's speech to the diplomatic corps on 11 January. (C)

Swaziland: King Sobhuza, Traditionalism, and Succession (U) 20

As the Swazi people and the economy become more sophisticated King Sobhuza's autocratic style is being viewed as an anachronism by growing numbers of educated Swazis. (C)

25X1A

Rhodesia: The Emergence of Private Armies (U)

The use of former guerrillas--known as auxiliaries-- promises to be more of a disruptive factor in Rhodesia than a positive one. As originally conceived by Prime Minister Smith and his black nationalist partners when they agreed to the internal settlement last March, guerrillas who took advantage of the transitional government's amnesty program would be put into uniform and used to encourage other guerrillas to defect. In practice, however, the ex-guerrillas have been organized into private armies loyal to Bishop Muzorewa or to Ndabaningi Sithole. (C)

Rhodesian security officials estimate that Muzorewa has as many as 2,000 former guerrillas under arms while Sithole may have as many as 750. They are operating in 22 of Rhodesia's 52 tribal trust lands, mainly in eastern and southern Rhodesia and around Salisbury and Fort Victoria. They are supposed to coordinate their military operations with Rhodesian security forces, and some white officers are assigned to monitor their activities. In essence, however, they are responsible only to the political organizations to which they ostensibly belong, either Muzorewa's United African National Council or Sithole's faction of the Zimbabwe African National Union. (S NF NC OC)

The auxiliaries--mostly defectors from Robert Mugabe's Mozambique-based faction of ZANU--have a mixed military record. [REDACTED]

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25X1C [REDACTED] the auxiliaries have had fair success in restoring a number of basic welfare services in the trust lands and thereby winning local support for Muzorewa or Sithole. (S NF NC OC)

On the other hand, Rhodesian military reports indicate that the auxiliaries often have performed poorly in clashes with guerrillas. The Rhodesians are not using the auxiliaries as an offensive, counterinsurgency force, however. Until recently, they did not receive

19 January 1979

any military training beyond what they acquired as guerrillas, and they are armed basically with what they brought with them when they defected. (S NF NC OC)

Nevertheless, many security officials believe that the auxiliary program has gotten off to a good start and they would like to see it expanded. The military high command has decided to provide some training and logistical support and to bolster the auxiliaries with personnel from regular black military units. Military officials believe that if Muzorewa and Sithole had sufficient funds they could attract large numbers of defectors. Smith, however, does not want the two black leaders to establish large private armies and has refused to review the law that forbids black political organizations from soliciting private financial support or bringing into Rhodesia funds raised abroad. (S NF NC OC)

The auxiliaries receive basic subsistence but because of a lack of funds they are not paid on a regular basis. As a result, they often resort to extorting food and money from local villagers. In addition, political intimidation has become widespread. The auxiliaries are forcing villagers to swear allegiance to Muzorewa or Sithole and the competition for new party members is strong. Late last year the government was forced to ban the "sale" of party membership cards and T-shirts in order to curb coercive membership drives. (C)

Last November, two of Sithole's auxiliaries were sentenced to death for the murders of five villagers who were not Sithole supporters. The incident forced the resignation of the black cominister of defense--a Sithole appointee--who had provided the auxiliaries with arms and had harbored them after the killings. Nor is Chief Chirau, the third black leader in the transitional government, immune from the trend toward political violence, even though he has no auxiliaries behind him. Two Chirau supporters, including Chirau's brother, recently were sentenced to four years' imprisonment for setting fire to business properties belonging to a Muzorewa supporter. (C)

19 January 1979

Outlook

The Rhodesian media, presumably with official cooperation, have been giving favorable publicity to Muzorewa, Sithole, and their auxiliaries over the past several months, some of which has been deserved. On balance, however, the Rhodesians are taking a shortsighted view of the auxiliaries. Already, their activities have become disturbingly reminiscent--albeit on a smaller scale and in a different political context--of the situation that prevailed in Angola prior to the civil war. (U)

The temptation for Muzorewa and Sithole to carve out political fiefdoms in the countryside will only grow stronger as the national elections draw closer. Clashes between their supporters are likely to become commonplace in the scramble for popular support. At the same time, of course, the guerrillas will be doing their utmost to disrupt the electoral process. Thus, the regular Rhodesian security forces are likely to find themselves caught between a growing insurgency and a rising tide of violence inspired by leaders in a government that they are attempting to defend. (C)

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19 January 1979

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Rhodesia: Dim Economic Outlook (U)

The economy, which had been a source of strength to the government of Prime Minister Ian Smith during most of the period since Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, has deteriorated in the past three years. The pace of decline will speed up in 1979 if white emigration and guerrilla activity continue to increase. (C)

Despite UN economic sanctions, real economic growth averaged 6 percent in the decade after UDI, largely because of the development of import substitutes and the diversification of agriculture. Since 1974, the trend has reversed dramatically, with GNP falling about 16 percent. While the recession so far has mainly reflected weakening internal and foreign demand, a likely increase in guerrilla activity this year points to greater problems on the supply side. The economic decline seems certain to continue, the only question being the pace of the drop. (C)

The Demand Side: Accumulating Problems

The economic slump of the past three years largely reflects the increasing burden of defense, erosion of the middle class market by white emigration, and waning business confidence due to persistent guerrilla activity and highly uncertain political prospects. These factors contributed to the near collapse of private investment in 1976-78 while undermining consumer spending. Weak international demand for Rhodesian products, in part related to economic sanctions, further eroded national output. Without substantial South African financial support, economic losses would have been still greater. (C)


The Defense Burden

The mounting diversion of resources into defense since 1975 has directly undercut economic growth, since Rhodesia buys most of its military equipment and supplies

19 January 1979

RHODESIA: Selected Economic Indicators

Percent Change

**Unclassified**

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abroad, except for small arms and ammunition. Direct military, police, and internal security outlays in the fiscal year ending in July will reach an estimated \$400 million, 28 percent of total budget expenditures compared with only 17 percent earlier in the 1970s. Counting the defense-related expenditures of other ministries--estimated at \$50 million in the current fiscal year--the cost of defense rises to nearly one-third of the budget. (C)

To help finance the domestic costs of the military buildup, the government has initiated programs to tap private savings. Under the latest mandatory bond purchase program, all white taxpayers and about 1,000 high-income blacks must buy government bonds equal in amount to 12.5 percent of their income tax. To help free foreign exchange for military imports, Salisbury has tightened quotas on imports of civilian goods, including raw materials and capital equipment. (C)

White Emigration*

Further dampening domestic demand has been an upsurge in white emigration in the past three years attributable to declining living standards, increasing war

*For a discussion of emigration trends and their economic/political/military implications, see "Rhodesia: White Emigration on Rise," Economic Intelligence Weekly Review, 5 January 1979, pp. 4-8.

19 January 1979

casualties, and mounting uncertainties surrounding the transition to black majority rule. On a net basis, an estimated 31,000 persons officially emigrated in 1976-78, a loss of about 12 percent of the white population. Another 20,000 to 30,000 Rhodesians may have left on "extended vacations." This drain, which is concentrated in the middle class, has reduced the demand for furniture, appliances, and other consumer goods and has contributed to a steep decline in housing construction. Only increased South African purchases of light manufactures arrested the drop in industrial output in 1978. (C)

Sagging Confidence

Business confidence of course has suffered from the uncertainties associated with stepped-up guerrilla activity and with Smith's so-called internal settlement. Planned industrial plant construction has dwindled to \$7 million annually from a peak of \$34 million in 1974, and purchases of machinery and equipment have also plummeted. As in the case of housing, most new business investment is apparently going into physical security rather than into the buildup of economic assets--an ominous sign for future economic growth. (C)

Exports and Sanctions

Since 1974, weak foreign demand for Rhodesian commodities has reinforced the deterioration in domestic demand. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the impact of economic sanctions on Rhodesian exports was mitigated by the scramble on world markets to secure raw materials, which make up one-third of total Rhodesian exports. As developed-country demand slumped in the aftermath of the

Rhodesia: Balance of Payments

Million US \$

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Merchandise trade balance	159	98	58	259	215	150
Exports ¹	702	820	870	905	865	827
Imports ¹	543	722	812	646	650	677
Services balance	-173	-216	-222	-208	-222	-237
Transfer payments	-12	-33	-46	-38	-25	-28
Current account balance	-26	-151	-210	13	-32	-115
Net capital transactions	92	111	178	43	-36	170
Total current and capital transactions	66	-40	-32	56	-68	55

¹ Estimated.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 January 1979

1973-74 oil price hikes, however, the existence of sanctions no doubt caused Rhodesia to suffer disproportionately from the drop in world demand. Many foreign firms turned to alternative suppliers of chrome, nickel, copper, tin, and asbestos; Rhodesian mining output was 9 percent less in real terms in 1978 compared with 1973. In the particular case of chrome, the drop was reinforced by repeal of the Byrd Amendment in March 1977, a move that cut off the lucrative American market, and by a new European metallurgical process that reduces the cost competitiveness of high-grade Rhodesian ores. (C)

The Supply Side: Light But Growing Damage

Although on the rise, physical damage has so far been relatively light and concentrated in rural areas. In the zones with the highest guerrilla activity--along the Mozambican border and northeast of Salisbury--many small white-owned farms have been abandoned because of the constant threat to homesteads, cattle, crops, and vehicular traffic. In the tribal trust lands set aside for blacks, thousands of dip tanks used for tickborne disease control have been destroyed. The ensuing spread of livestock diseases--nearly eradicated prior to the guerrilla war--caused an estimated \$80 million in cattle losses in 1978. Most large inland plantations, however, apparently have not suffered much damage. (C)

The only major urban damage inflicted by guerrillas so far has been the destruction in December 1978 of roughly 300,000 barrels of oil--15 to 20 days supply at estimated current consumption rates--at the Salisbury fuel depot. The replacement of the lost \$8 million worth of storage facilities and oil will prove difficult because of the country's foreign exchange bind and disruptions in South African oil supplies due to the Iranian strikes. The impact of this attack on white morale may prove more damaging than the loss of assets since it could lead to an acceleration in white emigration. (C)

Impact on Living Standards

On average, the blacks are suffering more from the recession than the whites. Employment among black wage earners--almost 40 percent of the 2.4 million black labor force--has dropped by at least 33,000 persons since 1975. Heavy job losses have occurred in plantation agriculture and in construction, which traditionally provide employment for 40 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of the

19 January 1979

country's black wage earners. The 1.5 million black subsistence farmers have also been hard hit by war-related cattle and crop losses and supply shortages. Many of these farmers as well as those who once worked on white plantations are flooding into the already over-crowded black townships in Salisbury and Umtali. (C)

The remaining whites are also tightening their belts, largely because the prices of basic foodstuffs are rising while salaries stagnate. The most severely affected whites are those in the service sectors, such as salesmen, shopkeepers, and construction contractors, many of whom are joining the white exodus. The decline in real incomes among white farmers is lessened to some degree by high prices for key crops and Salisbury's willingness to provide subsidies; the jobs of many white industrial workers are also protected by subsidies. (C)

Payments Developments

Although the recession has slashed the demand for most important goods in recent years, the rising costs of military imports and difficulties in finding export markets are weakening the current account, which was probably \$115 million in the hole in 1978, compared with a deficit of only \$32 million in 1977. The trade surplus fell by nearly one-third in 1978, to an estimated \$150 million, as bad weather reduced tobacco and cotton shipments and demand for key mineral exports remained low. Although freight and insurance payments may have dropped somewhat, tourist receipts have fallen off badly. In addition, the middle men that help circumvent trade sanctions are undoubtedly hiking their fees because of the mandatory US arms embargo adopted against South Africa in early 1978. (C)

With reserves probably fluctuating around the equivalent of one month's imports through much of 1978, Salisbury has had to borrow heavily to cover the current account deficit. South Africa undoubtedly is the major creditor, and financial support probably ran into several hundreds of millions of dollars last year. In addition, a \$15 million Eurocurrency loan was secured in July 1978; other possible creditors include confidential sources in some Middle Eastern countries. (S NF OC)

19 January 1979

Outlook: Continued Downturn

A likely pickup in guerrilla activity in 1979 points to further economic losses even if the scheduled transition to black majority rule in May goes off relatively smoothly. The guerrillas operating inside Rhodesia more than doubled in number over 1977, to about 10,000, and are being bolstered by military supplies from the Communists and other sources. Depending on the pattern and intensity of their strikes, the economic decline of Rhodesia could be either precipitous or gradual. For instance, a few major incidents of urban terrorism could easily spark a massive surge in emigration, which is apt to accelerate in any event. A white population loss on the order of 25 percent, a plausible development given the large numbers of Rhodesians who are already considering leaving, would chop at least 15 percent off of GNP. The loss of managerial and skilled labor talent would make economic recovery by any type of black government difficult. (S NF NC)

A gradual encroachment of guerrilla activity into Rhodesia's central economic heartland would lead to a less precipitous economic decline. Although many white farmers would cling to their plantations, the guerrillas could drive increasing numbers of black farm workers into city enclaves, cutting into output of cash crops. Similarly, mining output would begin to suffer, while transportation disruptions would continue to increase. As physical damage and casualties mounted, large numbers of white Rhodesians would leave the country, further reinforcing the decline. (C) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT)

19 January 1979

25X1A

Nigeria: Election Scheduling Dilemma (U)

Nigeria's military rulers face some agonizing and potentially controversial decisions in scheduling elections as the country enters the most difficult phase of its planned transition to civilian rule in October. Despite mounting public impatience, the regime continues to put off formal scheduling of a series of elections this year that are intended to lead to a transfer of power. The delay apparently stems mainly from electoral-related logistic difficulties and the problem of how to deal with the realization that a presidential runoff contest probably will be necessary. (C)

There are a number of indications that the cycle of elections may be altered and that they are unlikely to begin until this summer instead of early spring as had been expected. It is also possible that the procedure in Nigeria's new constitution for a presidential runoff election will be altered. All of this does not necessarily mean the timetable for the advent of constitutional government will be pushed back, but some slippage is possible. (C)

Government officials are planning the election schedule with the expectation that a presidential runoff will be required. Because the three major regionally based parties are likely to split the vote, the regime now expects a deadlock under constitutional rules that require the presidential victor to obtain a plurality nationwide and a quarter of the votes in 13 of 19 states. Failing that, the Constitution provides that the selection is to be made by an electoral college consisting of all members of the federal National Assembly--95 senators and 450 members of the House of Representatives--and the 1,350 members of the 19 state assemblies. Two presidential candidates participate in the runoff--the one with the highest number of votes countrywide and the individual among the remaining contenders with a plurality of votes in the highest number of states. (C)

19 January 1979

SECRET

In order for the electoral college arrangement to work, federal and state legislatures must be elected, in place, and reasonably operational well before the presidential contest. Tentative government planning had called for a cycle of elections some time between April and July in five successive stages: state legislative assemblies, the federal House of Representatives, the federal Senate, state governors, and the federal presidency. Several hurdles have now become evident, most notably:

- The federal electoral commission is far from ready logistically to supervise elections involving more than 47 million registered voters. Specifically, precinct boundaries and polling places have not been determined, supplies and equipment are not in place, and the staff to man the polls has not been recruited or trained.
- Many state governments have not even begun to think about preparing for the organization and operation of state assemblies and the training of state assembly staff members. (C)

Given the lag in logistic preparations, the cycle of elections will probably not begin before June or July. Thought is being given to combining some elections--such as those on the state level--to save time. Lower ranking officials believe that separate races would probably be more easily handled by Nigeria's inexperienced and largely illiterate electorate. According to the US Embassy, however, several members of the ruling military council are advocating that only two sets of elections be held or even one that would include all five contests. With preparations for the operation of state assemblies moving so slowly, the military government reportedly is considering the option of a national runoff election, in place of an electoral college solution, if the presidential contest is not decided in the first round. The chairman of the federal electoral commission recently told a US Embassy official that a second national election definitely would be held if needed. (C)

The military government thus faces some tough choices. If the election schedule is delayed substantially, Nigeria's ethnically oriented and confrontation-prone civilian politicians would have even more time for campaigning. A

19 January 1979

SECRET

delay also would further increase chances for serious communal unrest that could force the cancellation of plans for civilian rule. If the government opts for relatively early elections with imperfect logistical preparations, it runs an even greater risk of stormy elections and controversial election results. The latter choice would also probably result in nullifying the constitutional provision for a presidential runoff selection in favor of a more workable procedure. (C)

Nigeria's aspiring presidential contenders and competing regional and tribal groups will be watching the government's election decisions closely for the impact on their electoral chances. The parties are expected to concentrate their efforts on the first election on the presumption that the winning party will be perceived as the eventual national victor and will benefit from a bandwagon effect. After the first set of elections, some party mergers and political realignments are likely, altering somewhat the present regional lineup. The chances for electoral violence will also increase if leaders of those parties faring poorly cannot accept the possibility of overall defeat at the hands of their rivals. (C)

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19 January 1979

SECRET

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Ivory Coast: Irreparable Split Between Houphouet-Boigny and Yace (S)

A widening rift between Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny and his constitutional successor, Philip Yace, who serves as National Assembly president and party secretary general, will probably prompt Houphouet to remove Yace from the line of succession sometime soon, [REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED] (S NF NC)

Houphouet reportedly plans early this year to name a prime minister and to press for a constitutional amendment that would provide that he, rather than the National Assembly president, would assume the national presidency upon Houphouet's death and retain the office until the next regularly scheduled elections now set for 1980. In addition, Houphouet reportedly intends to ensure that the prime minister will be the presidential candidate of the Ivory Coast Democratic Party--the country's sole political party--in those elections. Houphouet also plans to remove Yace from the post of party Secretary General. (S NF NC)

The President, who is 72 years old, apparently is infuriated by Yace's heavyhanded style and has lost confidence in Yace's ability to maintain national support in the post-Houphouet era. Houphouet, for example, was disturbed by the popular resistance to the authoritarian manner in which Yace conducted the recent selection of party candidates for the mayoral elections. Yace, who claims to have been protecting party interests, tried to avoid primary elections and instead insisted on choosing party candidates through a controlled, consensus approach involving local government and party officials. Houphouet reversed Yace's decision and authorized primary elections in those communities that had resisted Yace. The President's action was viewed by Ivorians as a direct slap at Yace and it produced a considerable loss of face for the President's heir apparent. Houphouet may also have been angered by Yace's reported practice of issuing instructions to members of the party's political bureau without presidential clearance. (S NF NC)

19 January 1979

SECRET



19 January 1979

SECRET

SECRET

The election incident further strained Yace's already poor relationship with many of his party colleagues. Although Yace has a reputation for tough political infighting, he has many enemies and lacks the power and popularity needed to thwart his ouster. Yace probably is unable to put together an ethnic or other constituency strong enough to aid him in a showdown with Houphouet. (S NF NC)

If Houphouet goes through with his plans, he will probably appoint Mathieu Ekra, the Minister of Reform of State Societies and a longtime enemy of Yace, to the post of prime minister. Ekra, like Yace, is an apparent follower of Houphouet's moderate, pragmatic domestic and foreign policies, which have featured a relatively liberal political atmosphere, heavy Western investment, and close relations with the West--especially France and the United States. (S NF NC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT)

19 January 1979



Madagascar's President Ratsiraka being greeted by Soviet leaders in Moscow
on 29 June 1978

19 January 1979

25X1A

Madagascar: Ratsiraka's New Year's Speech (U)

President Ratsiraka strongly criticized the West in his New Year's speech to the diplomatic corps on 11 January, departing noticeably from his previously cool, but not antagonistic, remarks. Although he did not mention the United States by name, he singled it out for:

- Developing the neutron bomb.
- Creating a military base at Diego Garcia.
- Allegedly supporting Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith with arms sales.
- Refusing economic sanctions against South Africa.

In contrast to these remarks, the President praised Soviet President Brezhnev and Pope John Paul II as defenders of peace which, he asserted, is threatened by Western military activities. (C)


Although Ratsiraka's speech could be read to suggest he intends to strengthen his already warm relations with the Soviets, he may have intended it simply as a rhetorical tradeoff for Soviet assistance. Ratsiraka signed several military and economic agreements during a visit to Moscow last June. He is currently waiting for the delivery of Soviet MIG-21s and probably hopes that his anti-US speech will be accepted as partial payment; at the moment at least, he seems eager to avoid giving in to a longstanding Soviet request for base rights at Diego Suarez.* (C)

*Ratsiraka has refused to allow any country to use Madagascar's ports for military visits. We have no evidence that any Soviet destroyers on patrol in the Indian Ocean have docked during the past several years. (S NF)

19 January 1979

SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010041-5



19 January 1979

Ratsiraka has repeatedly resisted Soviet requests for the base rights, despite Moscow's substantial military aid. He is suspicious of Soviet motives, and fears that he will be faced with strong domestic opposition if he grants the Soviet use of the harbor. He also probably recognizes he might endanger important Western--especially French--economic interests. In addition, he probably reasons that a Soviet presence would undermine his aspiration for leadership among the Indian Ocean states and the Third World. (C)

There is, however, an outside chance that Ratsiraka--whose position is far from secure--may believe that a strong Soviet military presence would give pause to would-be coup plotters, particularly those on the left. Despite his repeated assertions that he would not permit superpower use of Malagasy ports, Ratsiraka's publicly proclaimed affinity with the Soviets lays the groundwork for a switch in this policy. Since the French mercenary involvement in the takeover on the Comoro Islands last May, the President has stepped up contacts with the Soviets, calling them a "natural" ally of Madagascar. (C)

Ratsiraka has also been concerned about South African overflights and recently increased the Defense Ministry's budget to prepare against an alleged "threat of foreign invasion." Furthermore, a Soviet presence might placate the leftist students who rioted last May and were rumored to have been encouraged by a radical and influential Supreme Revolutionary Council member. The extent to which Ratsiraka perceives that plotters--domestic or external--present an imminent threat, might well affect his decision on whether to open Diego Suarez to the Soviets. (C)

Whatever Ratsiraka's ultimate intentions are toward the Soviets, his pro-Moscow leanings have already engendered some domestic opposition. One member of the National Assembly and the Supreme Revolutionary Council, Dr. Razanabahiny Marojama, who regards trade with the West as more beneficial to Madagascar than a close relationship with the USSR, is already working behind the

25X1C scenes, [REDACTED] to reduce Soviet influence over the government. Marojama claims to have support from a number of other Council members. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

19 January 1979

SECRET

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Swaziland: King Sobhuza, Traditionalism, and Succession* (U)

Swaziland became independent in 1968 with its traditional political structure intact and in some ways strengthened by the British system of indirect rule during the country's years as a protectorate. During the period prior to independence the country operated under a dual government structure: a formal Western-style parliamentary system inherited from the British and the Swazi National Council (SNC), a group of chiefs and headmen dominated by the King. In theory, the SNC only dealt with tribal matters but it always maintained a strong voice in governmental affairs. (C)

The veneer provided by the British-imposed constitution and parliamentary form of government left the King a great deal of room for exercising political power but it also left room for a substantial degree of political maneuvering by nontraditional oriented political parties. King Sobhuza staked his prestige on the formation of his own political party and won an overwhelming victory, sweeping 24 seats, during the country's first postindependence election in 1967. During the next election in 1973, however, Sobhuza's party lost three of the 24 parliamentary seats and the King dissolved Parliament, suspended the Constitution, and assumed power by decree. (C)

Most of the vote against Sobhuza's party in 1973 came from an area that contained the capital city, much of the country's developed industry, the civil servants, and almost half of Swaziland's urban population. While many observers did not feel that the loss of three parliamentary seats represented a serious threat to the King and his party, the King probably interpreted the vote as the initial stages of the

²⁰This is the second in a series of articles exploring the problems of leadership and succession in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

19 January 1979

SECRET

breakdown of tribal authority. Sobhuza probably felt that as the country continued to modernize and the civil service and urban population expanded the day would inevitably come when the opposition would be able to mount a serious threat to his power. (C)

Perhaps as a sop to his critics, the King instituted a complicated electoral process last October for establishing a new bicameral parliament. Forty members of the lower house have been chosen through an electoral college directly elected from Swaziland's largely rural electoral districts. The King has named 10 additional members to the House and 10 to the Senate. The next step will involve the 50-member house electing 10 additional members to the Senate. Selection of the members of Parliament apparently is to be completed this month, but it is unclear how much latitude parliamentarians will have. The deliberate pace that Sobhuza's government has followed in selecting the new members suggests he is putting together a body that will not interfere with his authority. (C)

Basis for Traditional Rule

Sobhuza's move in 1973 met with little opposition and was heartily supported by Swazi traditionalists. Unlike most other African countries at independence, in which the traditional political elites contended not only with modern political factionalism but also with other tribal groupings, the King and his traditionalist allies were aided by Swaziland being culturally and socially homogeneous. Further, in 1973 Swaziland was surrounded by white minority governments that had little interest in the country other than maintaining the political status quo. Swazi traditionalists, led by the King, could thus control more easily Swazi political modernists than might have been the case if the contiguous countries had been led by African governments that disliked the King's style of rule. (U)

As long as the 79-year-old Sobhuza remains healthy and vigorous he will continue to dominate Swazi political life, but it is questionable that the power of the monarchy, so carefully built up during his tenure, can be passed on to his successor. The King, who has been on the throne since 1921, has proved to be an astute and flexible politician. Now, however, he is increasingly

19 January 1979

SECRET

challenged by problems not easily reconcilable with the traditionalist-based solutions that have worked over the years. As the Swazi people and the economy become more sophisticated, Sobhuza's autocratic style is being viewed as an anachronism by growing numbers of educated Swazis. There is an unquestioned reservoir of reverence and affection for Sobhuza, but this is unlikely to be easily transferred to his successor. (C)

The Selection Process

Choosing a new king is a complicated process and traditionally the heir to the throne is not designated or even known during the king's lifetime. In theory, the king and his mother (Ndlovukazi) rule coequally, although in practice the King clearly dominates. When the king dies the Ndlovukazi and the dead King's senior paternal uncles call a family council to choose a successor. They are required by customary law to select only a son of the dead king's "favorite" wife; who is favorite depends on circumstances, but is often associated with clan rank. If the heir is a minor, the favorite wife rules in conjunction with the Ndlovukazi until he comes of age and his mother becomes the new Ndlovukazi. Tradition dictates that the nation cannot be without a Ndlovukazi; should she die before her son, one of her sisters is selected to be the Ndlovukazi. Sobhuza's mother died in 1938 and the current Ndlovukazi exercises little authority. (C)

Outlook

The installation of a new king may well usher in a period of uncertainty. The prospect for continued stability in Swaziland depends heavily on the new King's personality and character. He could be anything from an enlightened progressive monarch to a strongly xenophobic tribal traditionalist. Whoever is chosen, the next King may have difficulty in dominating the political life of Swaziland to the extent Sobhuza has. The present King had over 30 years under the aegis of the British to gain experience and political expertise before he was called on to play a meaningful governing role; the next king will be faced with the need to act as soon as he assumes office and will be faced with a political system dominated by traditionalminded politicians with experience and confidence. (C)

19 January 1979

There are several important economic factors that will further complicate the next ruler's ability to govern as an absolute monarch. The present generation of workers and educated Swazis is unlikely to accept without question the authority and paternalism of the king as did earlier generations. Because the present King and his government rely almost exclusively on the tribal system for its political power, such opposition as currently exists has sprung almost entirely from the modern sector and has grown in concert with it. During 1971-76, the number of Swazis with education beyond the secondary level has quadrupled while secondary school enrollment increased by more than 50 percent. The number of trained Swazis available for employment in the modern sector has been growing at the rate of 10 percent a year, and the growing ranks of unemployed and underemployed could become a threat to royal absolutism. Those in the modern sector who now make up about 25 percent of the Swazi society may try to bring pressure on the new ruler for remedies for their frustrations, remedies that probably will entail substantial modification of the present traditionalist/tribal framework. (C)

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